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Abstract  
 
This paper analyses whether agricultural information flows give rise to social learning 
effects in banana cultivation in Nyakatoke, a small Tanzanian village. Based on a 
village census, full information is available on socio-economic characteristics and 
banana production of farmer kinship members, neighbours and informal insurance 
group members. This allows a test for social learning within these groups and the 
identification of different types of social effects. Controlling for exogenous group 
characteristics, the effect of group behaviour on individual farmer output is studied. 
The results show that social effects are strongly dependent on the definition of the 
reference group. It emerges that no social effects are found in distance based groups, 
exogenous social effects linked to group education exist in informal insurance groups, 
and only kinship related groups generate the endogenous social effects that produce 
positive externalities in banana output.   
 
JEL Classification: O12; O13; O55; Q12 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates social interactions effects in the diffusion of pest-resistant 
agricultural technologies in a village in Kagera, Tanzania. To investigate technology 
diffusion, we have access to a unique full village level census of social networks, 
interactions and sources of knowledge. Furthermore, access to multiple observations 
on actual output over time allows us to focus not only on the adoption of the 
techniques, but also to quantify the impact of social effects on productivity. The 
village census allows us to explore a variety of possibly reference groups providing 
social effects. 
In Kagera, in North-western Tanzania, population pressure is high and land is 
getting increasingly scarce. Soil fertility is decreasing and the local staple food, the 
Eastern African Highland banana, has become prone to diseases and pests. Farmer 
extension workers promote the use of technologies that mitigate the negative effects 
of banana diseases and weevil attacks. Although it appears that only few farmers are 
interested in learning techniques directly from the extension workers, social learning 
effects are likely to exist and produce positive externalities. In this paper we study 
whether and how interactions among farmers augment the effects of the few farmers 
directly interacting with extension officers.  
A broad literature exists on the adoption of agricultural technologies (see e.g. 
Feder, Just and Zilberman (1985) and Besley and Case (1993)).  Farmer 
characteristics such as human capital, degree of risk aversion and farm size are often 
found to influence adoption. But the assumption that farmer behaviour is also 
influenced by other farmers’ actual behaviour or mere attitude towards a new 
technology has been gaining support. Although theoretical support of social effects in 
technology adoption has been quite common (for example, Ellison and Fudenberg, 
1993, 1995; Gale, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 1998; Bardhan and Udry, 1999), empirical 
evidence measuring the importance of social effects is less extensive (Case, 1992; 
Besley and Case, 1994; Udry and Conley, 2001; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Munshi, 
2004).  
Especially sparse are the attempts to measure quantitatively the productive 
externalities of social learning. Where learning takes place, social effects are driven 
by information flows as opposed to mimicking or social pressure. As a way to 
 2
distinguish the former from the latter Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) suggest analysing 
the effect of neighbours productivity enhancing behaviour on individual productivity 
rather than on individual (technique adoption) behaviour.  
Another difficulty in empirical work is the definition of the relevant reference 
group. Not knowing the exact reference group seriously worsens the problem of 
identifying social effects as was argued by Manski (1993, 2000). Because of data 
constraints many authors use geographical boundaries to define farmer information 
networks. This may be the whole district as in Case (1992), the school as in Evans et 
al. (1992) or the village as in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) or Munshi (2004). Also 
ethnicity has been used as reference group, for example by Borjas (1992, 1995). 
These groups are usually very large, but the relevant social interaction group may be 
much more limited.   
Some findings suggest that farmer information reference groups are positioned at a 
smaller level than what has been studied before. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) find 
for rural Indian farmers during the Green Revolution that villagers learn from 
neighbours experience in adopting high-yielding variety seeds but the effects are 
small compared to the effects of own experience. The authors suggest that villagers 
use the information of only a couple of neighbours.1  Udry and Conley (2001) have 
also shown that information on the amount of inputs to use in pineapple cultivation in 
Ghana flows through networks not covering the whole village. Bandiera and Rasul 
(2006) show for sunflower adoption in Mozambique, that adoption decisions are 
correlated within family and friends groups but less so within religious based groups 
and not at all between groups of different religion. Inspired by these findings, this 
paper focuses on whether social effects in banana cultivation differ in type and 
magnitude according to the definition of the reference group. 
A major innovation of the current study is that unlike most studies in the past, the 
Nyakatoke data were collected with the specific aim of analysing social effects.2  The 
data take the form of a full village census of households and their interactions: all 
households in the village are included and precise information exists on different 
types of intra-village social networks. This allows us to use other than only 
                                                 
1 Brock and Durlauf (2001) describe the difference between global and local interactions. In the case of 
global interactions each individual assigns an identical weight to the behaviour of every other member 
of the population. In the case of local interactions each agent is assumed to interact directly with only a 
finite number of other people.   
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geographical definitions of “the” reference group to investigate whether social 
learning effects exist and are of similar importance in different reference groups. The 
data allow for comparison among three social groups, namely kinship-based, distance- 
based and self-reported informal insurance groups.  
Even when information on the reference group is available, identifying true social 
effects is not straightforward, as was shown in the seminal work of Manski (1993), 
and later by Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Durlauf (2002).3 Especially where choice 
affects the formation of the group (endogenously formed groups), group effects have 
to be interpreted carefully as the results in Evans et al. (1992) show. Most of the 
groups considered do not suffer from endogenous group formation. Nevertheless, to 
distinguish endogenous and exogenous social effects, we use extensive exogenous 
characteristics of the group members.  
This paper can improve considerably on earlier work. First, we have access to a 
full village census of households and their social networks. As a result, we do not 
need to rely on self-reported numbers of friends and family, such as whether they 
have adopted particular techniques, but can retrieve all this information from the 
interviews with all network partners.  The village census of networks also allows us to 
distinguish possible learning effects in different networks, beyond the geographically 
defined effects usually studied. Secondly, the village census also allows us to test 
appropriately for social learning, by showing that not only a household’s behaviour is 
affected by group behaviour, but also that its productivity is affected (Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1995)). The village census data include also lagged household level 
productivity data to implement our test of social learning. Furthermore, the village 
census allows us to identify the most productive farmers within their reference group, 
and which in turn can be excluded from the analysis to take into account the likely 
existence of a direction to social learning as suggested by Case (1992).  
The results suggest that social effects in technique adoption exist in all groups but 
to a lesser extent in distance based reference groups. Analysing farmer banana output 
rather than technique adoption, it appears that exogenous social effects from group 
education exist in informal insurance groups, but the endogenous social effects which 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Data collection by author  and Joachim De Weerdt (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Economic 
Development Initiatives, Bukoba, Tanzania) and a team of local enumerators. 
3 A survey article on social capital by Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) treats identification and other 
issues that arise when analysing social capital in depth; a survey article by Soetevent (2006) focuses on 
the empirics of identification of social interactions. 
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produce a social multiplier effect, only exist in kinship related groups. The results are 
also suggestive of a direction to learning from the more to the less productive farmers 
in the group. These results suggest that social capital can play a positive role in 
household agricultural production parallel to its role in entrepreneurial activity (Barr, 
2000; Fafchamps and Minten, 2002). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides descriptive 
statistics of the learning and advice seeking behaviour of the farmers in Nyakatoke. 
Section 3 lays out the analytical framework and discusses the unique features of the 
dataset while section 4 presents the empirical specifications. Results are discussed in 
Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
 
2. Information networks in Nyakatoke 
 
Nyakatoke is a small village in the Kagera region of Tanzania, west of Lake 
Victoria. Banana is the main staple food and also an important cash crop for small 
scale farmers. The productivity of the indigenous banana trees has been declining for 
some years, mainly due to increased incidence of weevil attacks and panama disease. 
These pests are endemic, and have been gradually reducing the mean yield across all 
farmers in the village. Farmer extension officers are actively trying to introduce new 
and more resistant kinds of bananas, in combination with cultivation techniques that 
mitigate the effects of diseases. Although the output decline of the indigenous banana 
is perceived as a serious problem,4 the reaction of farmers both in terms of adopting 
new types of bananas and in terms of using productivity enhancing techniques is still 
in an early stage.5   
Data were collected during 2000 in five visits to the village with approximately 
two month intervals. Some data such as income and informal insurance assistance 
                                                 
4 The productivity decline is seen as one of the major economic problems in the village. 26 per cent of 
farmers believe their output decreased slightly and 45 per cent believes it decreased strongly between 
1990 and 2000. In Eastern Kagera (where the survey village is located) the average yield is only 3,100 
kilograms per hectare, whereas average yields remain around 6,800 and 7,500 kilo per hectare in 
respectively Central and Western Kagera (where the soil is less depleted), see Agricultural Research 
Institute Maruku (1999). 
5 Only 22 out of the 119 households have adopted other banana types than the indigenous eastern 
African highland banana. Most households have planted them for experimental reasons and they 
usually have only one or two plants.  
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were collected in each round, while other data were only collected during one of the 
visits. No household sampling was necessary. The survey includes all 119 households 
and all income earning adults living in a household. 
Two sets of data were collected to capture the sources of information on 
agricultural techniques. First, actual information flows were explored via questions on 
farmer knowledge, adoption and learning sources for 10 selected techniques, while 
secondly, hypothetical information flows were captured in the survey by a simple 
question “whom would you go to for advice if there was a problem with your crops?”.  
A list of 10 techniques for dealing with different banana problems was constructed 
based on the advice from extension workers.6 Some of these technologies are 
straightforward to apply. Others are more time consuming or need specific 
knowledge, while still others require inputs such as manure. Some are complements, 
while others are substitutes. As the different pests affecting bananas are endemic, the 
main benefits of these techniques is to stem the decline in yields and not so much to 
reduce the variance in yields.   
We found that on average, banana growing farmers knew between three and four 
of these techniques, although only 44 percent of the known technologies were actually 
used (or 1.6 techniques).  Of all the households, 19 percent knew of none while 37 
percent used none. There clearly is a large discrepancy between knowing and actually 
adopting a technique. The main reasons mentioned by respondents for not applying a 
certain technique were (1) doubts about the effectiveness of the technique, (2) having 
only recently learnt about it and not actually started applying it yet, (3) technique is 
too costly, or (4) difficulty of the technique. 
To explore the sources of knowledge and adoption further, we pooled all the 
binary variables, so that each known technique is one observation. Table 1 shows the 
different learning sources and their relative importance. Some 57 per cent of the 
techniques known have been pulled into the village and 43 per cent have been learnt 
from another farmer or group of farmers in the village. A higher percentage of the 
known techniques is actually applied when farmers have learnt it from an outside 
source, likely to reflect self-selection. Farmers, who learn techniques from outside, are 
more likely to put some effort into looking for information and to undertake 
                                                 
6 Techniques (re)introduced: special way of digging the hole (1), how to apply fertiliser/manure (2), hot 
water treatment of stem before planting (3), dipping stem in insecticide solution (4), how to mulch (5), 
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transaction costs to learn about the technique with a view to applying it. Farmers, who 
learn techniques from other farmers in the village, may do so accidentally, while 
visiting each other or discussing agricultural issues.  
 
Table 1 
Learning and diffusion of techniquesa 
Source % of techniques  
learnt from source 
% of known 
techniques used 
Information enters village via: 57  
   Farmers outside community 6  55 
   Formal extension (NGO/government/seminars) 48  47 
   Other (Self-taught, school) 3  50 
Diffused further via: 43  
   Farmers inside community 38  43 
   No specifically identifiable personb 6 32 
All techniques learnt 100   44 
a Several observations per household are possible, depending on the number of techniques known by 
the respondent (household head) so n=397 for the 119 households; b If the teacher of a technique could 
not be specified, it was either a dead person or a group of farmers. 
 
For all techniques which were learned from farmers in the community, the name 
of the ‘teacher’ was obtained. This allowed us to construct Figure A1 in Annex which 
represents all farmers, who know at least one technique, and the information source 
for each technique they learned (so multiple sources per farmer can exist if techniques 
were learned from different sources). The outside sources include extension workers, 
relatives living in other villages (outside relatives) or friends living in other villages 
(outside farmers),7 and other persons not known by name (outside no link). The 
existence of a two-layer structure can be observed. The first layer includes those 
farmers, who pull information into the village from outside. The second layer 
represents intra-village learning. It includes farmers, who receive their information 
from other community members. Most farmers appear to be linked directly or through 
only one other farmer to an outside learning source.  
In the survey, we also collected detailed information on hypothetical advisers, 
based on the question “whom would you go to for advice if there was a problem with 
your crops?”.8 In Annex Figure A2 all farmers in the village are connected to their 
hypothetical adviser. The graph differs substantially from the graph in Annex Figure 
                                                                                                                                            
trench-manuring (6), paring (7), desuckering (8), harvest hygiene (9), weevil trapping (10). See annex 
Table A1 for more detail on these techniques. 
7 In the case of “outside relatives”, this sometimes includes deceased relatives such as parents or 
grandparents. 
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A1 where it concerns the number of layers. With respect to hypothetical advice 
seeking, there are more layers of intra-village links. Various farmers are multiple 
steps away from the outside source of advice. In any case, both figures confirm that 
behind farmers, who pull information into the village, there are numerous other 
farmers, who apply that knowledge. 
In the remainder of this section, we explore this process further, and more 
specifically whether we can identify networks through which this information 
dissemination may take place.  As part of the survey, detailed questions where asked 
to identify different social networks within the village. Here, we focus on three social 
groupings. First, a household’s kinship network, defined as formed by all other 
households where at least one of the household members has a blood bond (up to the 
third degree) with the household in reference. Second, a household’s informal 
insurance group includes all households on which the household reports that it can 
rely in times of need and vice versa. Third, a neighbourhood network, which is more 
arbitrary by definition, but consists here as households living within 300 metres of 
each other. The 300 metres threshold was chosen since it is lower than the average 
distance between households in the village (523 metres); a lower threshold would 
exclude many remote observations.9
It is of interest to reveal whether intra-village learning and advice links exist more 
among members of certain social groups than among random villagers. To do so, we 
consider all possible pairs (dyads) of household heads in the village, defining as one if 
a pair has a learning link (i.e. one learned a technique from the other), and zero 
otherwise. For hypothetical links, we construct a similar variable but consider all 
possible pair of adults involved in banana farming. The resulting link variable is 
explored in a dyadic regression framework (for example, as in De Weerdt (2004) or 
Fafchamps and Gubert (2007)), regressing the link variable on relational and non-
relational variables (i.e. variables that describe the difference in a characteristic 
between a pair, and variables that control for the ‘level’ of the characteristic among 
the pair of adults). The latter type of variables is necessary to correct for type of 
                                                                                                                                            
8These are the “opinion leaders” in Rogers (1995). Opinion leaders can be identified by the sociometric 
method, which entails exactly the same question as was used in our survey (whom would you –actually 
or hypothetically- go to for advice or information). 
9 To test sensitivity of the results, we chose the 10 closest households to serve as “the neighbourhood”. 
All results were similar to those obtained by the 300 metres definition. Some coefficients were 
somewhat larger in magnitude, but they were not different in terms of significance, and not affecting 
the overall interpretation of our findings. 
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farmers we may be dealing with in the pair. For example, older farmers may have 
more experience in farming and therefore be more likely to be involved in information 
links. The same holds for larger farmers who may be better known or considered more 
innovative or knowledgeable. As relational variables we include the social group 
variables: whether the two persons belong to the same kin and to the same informal 
insurance network. Distance enters as a continuous variable measuring metres 
between the two homesteads. Additionally we include whether the two persons 
(individual respondents for hypothetical advice links, household heads for learning 
links) who are part of the pair are of the same sex, or age (if the difference is less or 
equal to 5 years), whether both have completed primary education or only one of both 
(base category is none of both), whether they live in households with the same land 
holdings (when the difference is less or equal to 0.5 hectares). For the advice link 
regression, which is at the individual level, we also include a dummy indicating that 
the two persons are living in the same household. The non-relational variables we 
include are the maximum age and the maximum landholdings of the farmers in the 
pair.10 (we follow De Weerdt, 2004, in the use of maximum values to correct for non-
relational effects).  
Table 2 shows that being a member of the same kin or informal insurance network 
and a lower geographical distance between households positively and significantly 
affect the probability of an actual or hypothetical information link between two 
respondents. Further, farmers usually learn or go for advice to other farmers of the 
same sex. For actual learning links it turns out that the larger the farm of one of both 
farmers in the pair, the more likely there is a link. For hypothetical advice 
age/experience of the farmer has a positive effect. Also intrahousehold information 
flows appear to exist. 
 
                                                 
10 We follow De Weerdt (2004) in the use of maximum values to correct for non-relational effects. 
Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) use the sum of the values of the pair. Using this correction for ‘level’ 
effects did not change the results. 
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Table 2 
Information links marginal effects (probit regressions) 
Technique learning links  
(HH)a
Hypothetical advice links  
(IND)b
Dependent variable: 1 if link 
exists 
Coeff x 104 Std. err.c/signif. Coeff x 104 Std. err.c/signif.  
Kinship related 42.448 22.998 *** 6.399 3.444 *** 
Distance between HHs (metres) -0.037 0.010 *** -0.007 0.003 *** 
Informal insurance members 35.147 18.692 *** 53.025 13.103 *** 
Same age (difference <=5 years) 4.024 6.532  3.565 2.095 ** 
Same sex 8.598 4.701 * 7.526 1.719 *** 
Both completed primary 5.757 8.596  -1.378 1.240  
Only one completed primary 3.705 6.547  0.066 1.191  
Same land (difference <= 0.5 ha)d -1.554 5.150  -1.437 1.147  
Maximum age 0.096 0.131  0.075 0.037 *** 
Maximum land (ha) 2.579 1.479 * 0.029 0.256  
Same household - -  7.367 6.752 * 
       
Observationse 11342   43062   
Pseudo R² 0.192   0.256   
aTechnique learning links are analysed at household level; bAdvice seeking links are analysed at 
individual level; cRobust standard errors, x 104; dHouseholds have on average 1.22 hectares of land; 
eAll households/individuals linked with all other households/individuals. A one directional learning 
link (link=1) exists for 40 combinations. Probability of an intra-village learning link: 0.3%. A one 
directional advice link exists for 86 combinations. Probability of an intra-village advice link: 0.2%. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 2 explored learning and advice links between farmers without taking into 
account the direction of the link, but as suggested by Case (1992) a direction may 
exist. This means that not everybody in the information network will be learning from 
everybody but some farmers will be teachers or advisers rather than “learners”. To 
explore this possibility we ranked all farmers in a network according to their 
agricultural productivity, assuming that whether a farmer is a teacher or a learner 
depends on his farming productivity. Table 3 shows indeed that farmers in the highest 
productivity quartile of the network are generally more likely to be mentioned as 
advisers or teachers than farmers in the lowest productivity quartile. This lends 
support for the existence of a learning or advising direction. 
 
Table 3 
Percentage teachers in lowest versus highest yield quartile farmers (within network) 
 Kinship groups Neighbours Informal insurance 
groups 
 <25% >75% <25% >75% <25% >75% 
Mentioned as adviser 16 44 16 39 16 38 
Mentioned as teacher 8 15 5 11 11 6 
 
To conclude, the evidence suggests that information entering the village from an 
outside source, such as farmer extension services, will diffuse through the village, but 
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rather than necessarily reaching all farmers in the village similarly (a common 
assumption in the literature where the village is often considered as the information 
reference group), it flows via networks.11 The evidence for Nyakatoke suggests that 
social relationships such as kinship or informal insurance ties and physical distance 
are relevant proxies for farmer agricultural information networks. Furthermore, it 
appears that within a network the more highly productive farmers are more likely to 
be mentioned as teachers of techniques and as advice sources. 
 
 
3. Formal framework  
 
In this section a formal framework is presented showing how behaviour in a 
farmer social group can affect own behaviour through information flows and how this 
process can differ among groups. Problems of identification that arise when analysing 
social effects are also discussed. 
 
3.1. Social effects in technique adoption behaviour 
 
The theoretical framework on Bayesian updating of beliefs described by Berger 
(1985) and applied in the analysis of technology adoption for example by Besley and 
Case (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Udry and Conley (2001) forms the 
basis for the presentation of the empirical test of social interactions and learning.  
Because there is only a certain percentage of farmers who actually apply a 
technique when knowing it, we assume farmer i initially believes that the production 
gain of applying the technique is not worth the effort. Each subsequent period reveals 
information about the true benefits of the technique through other farmers, who do 
apply it. Farmer i then updates prior beliefs using this information, and when farmer 
                                                 
11 The assumption that the whole village constitutes one information network is further questioned 
through the following observation. Respondents were asked to indicate in a list of 10 persons whether 
they had actually gone for advice to this particular person the year before the survey and how many 
times. Persons included were the local extension officer, the innovator of the village (who was 
identified during focus group discussions), some of their informal insurance network members and one 
randomly drawn male and female farmer. Of all advice farmers obtained (total number of times farmers 
went to seek advice the year before the survey), the percentage that was obtained from these randomly 
drawn persons was close to zero. The percentage of advice obtained from a randomly drawn female 
farmer was 0, from a male farmer 4, from the local extension officer 8 and the rest of farmers’ advice 
came from the village innovator and the insurance members listed. 
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i’s beliefs turn positive, the technique is adopted. If information is accurately 
transmitted farmer i is then also expected to obtain positive benefits from the 
technique. When this is the case, social learning effects exist. 
In what follows, we will first present the case where information is transmitted 
without any noise and flows perfectly between all farmers in the village. Noise is 
subsequently introduced in the process, assuming that the variance of the noise is 
dependent on the relationship between farmers. The latter captures the observed effect 
that some relationships appear to enhance beneficial diffusion more than others. 
The true benefit of a technique, X , identically and independently distributed 
across time and farmers, is assumed to be a normally distributed function, 
X~ ( 2,B )σΝ . All farmers know the variance  (no additional risk is associated with 
the techniques so farmers can infer the variance) but not the mean, 
2σ
B . They do hold 
beliefs about B . At t-1 farmer i has prior beliefs on the benefits of applying a 
technique, . Suppose the prior  is also normally distributed with mean 1−tB 1−tB 1−tβ  
and variance . At time t farmer i updates existing beliefs about the benefits of the 
technique taking into account own prior beliefs and the information revealed by the 
experimenting farmers (
2
1−tτ
tx  is the average benefit observed at time t of the n 
experimenting farmers). The posterior function )( XBf  will be normally distributed 
with mean )(xtβ  and variance 2tτ . If n farmers are experimenting and the information 
from their experiments reaches farmer i without noise, it follows from Bayesian 
updating rules that the updated expected benefit is:12
  
2
2
1
12
2 2
1 1
( ) tt t
t t
n
2 tx x
n n
σ
τβ βστ τ
−
−
− −
= +
+ + σ
 (1) 
The process can only be determined if the parameters of the prior distribution, 1−tβ  
and  are known. Reorganising (1) leads to: 2 1−tτ
( )2 11 12
2
1
( ) tt t t t
t
x x
n
τβ β βστ
−
− −
−
= + −
+
      (2)  
 12
Farm ards if the mean benefit obtained by the er i will update his beliefs downw
experimenting farmers is lower than the beliefs about the benefit held by farmer i and 
upwards in the other situation. When )(xtβ  becomes positive farmer i starts applying 
ation. Instead of observing  the farmer observes 
x
of farm  will be 
the technique.   
The assumption of perfect and equal information has been shown to be rather 
unrealistic (Udry and Conley, 2001). (1) can therefore be modified to hold in a 
situation of imperfect inform tx
tu+ . tu  is the measurement error, assumed to be independent from tx  and 
normally distributed with zero mean and variance equal to 2δ . The posterior beliefs 
t
er i ))(( tt uxBf + .  Since  is σBN  and  is δN  
and x and u are independent (
)(xf ),( 2 2)(ug ),0(
0),cov( =ux ),  is . Assuming that 
here ers have e rel ship, for
e and trust 
),( uxh ),( 22 δσ +BN
the updating of beliefs is dependent on the relationship with the experimenting 
farmers, the variance of the noise is small w  farm  a clos ation  
example if they have known each other for a long tim each other. The 
variance of the noise is large where the information is revealed by farmers with whom 
farmer i has no special relationship. As such the information which is revealed by a 
group k of experimenting farmers is weighted differently, according to the 
relationship between the farmers in group k. Farmer prior beliefs about the benefits of 
a technique are updated in the following way: 
 ( )2 11 12 2
2
1
( ) tt t t t
k
t
x x
n
τβ β βσ δτ
−
− −
−
= + −++
 (3) 
where the coefficient on the updating factor is sm
speed is dependent on the relationship of farmers in the information network. In the 
limit, 
aller due to noise and the updating 
2
kδ  goes to zero for a group k of highly trustworthy farmers and to infinity for 
 For 
farmers not trusted at all. 
2 0 :kδ →  
2
2
1( ) tt tn 12 2
2 2
1 1
t
t t
x xτβ β −= +
n n
σ
σ στ τ
−
− −+ +
 (4) 
                                                                                                                                            
12 The updated variance is: 
1
2
2 2
1
1
t
t
nτ σ τ
−
−
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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 For 2 :kδ →∞  1)( −= tt x ββ                                                                          (5) 
When 2kδ  goes to infinity, farmer i refrains from using the information revealed by the 
experimenting farmer, that is prior beliefs are not updated. This theory lends support 
to t e s of e ploring soci  e
 
ing it is 
ecessary to show that an individual’s productivity rather than behaviour is affected 
iour. As the final aim of the introduction of techniques is not 
technique diffusion per se but especially productivity increase, we test whether social 
lea
he usefuln s x al ffects across differently related groups. 
3.2. Social learning test  
 
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) state that, in order to detect social learn
n
by reference group behav
rning in banana cultivation takes place. We model farmer output as follows: 
 , 1 , ,( , )i t i t i tY f Z β+ =      (6) 
where , 1i tY +  is the output of farmer i in period t+1. ,i tZ  is a vector of characteristics of 
the farmer and of the land suitable to cultivate bananas. ,i tβ  is farmer i’s prior belief 
about the benefit (or expected benefit) of applying a technique. It contains a history of 
privat rmation in combination with information on experiences of other farmers 
and determines whether and how a technique is applied. As shown in (3) 
e info
,i tβ  is a 
combination of the beliefs of farmer i prior to experimentation, of the average benefit 
on experimenting farmers’ fields and on the relation between farmer i and the 
experimenting farmers. For the test, we have to make an assumption on , 1i tβ − . We 
assume that farmers own prior beliefs about the benefit of a technique are neutral. 
Therefore we only include the average benefit on the fields of n information network 
members ( ,i tX − ), corrected for the relevant weighting factor 
2
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k. Thus we will test for different networks k:  
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, ,, ,( , )i t ki t i tY f Z X −+  (7) 1 =
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To bring this to the data, w
equation of interest: 
e will use a log-linear form, resulting in the following 
, ,, 1log( )i tY α α+ = 0 1 , 2, ,log( ) log( )i t ki t k i tZ X uα −+ + +   for k=1,…,K  (8) 
 
If farmers in group k learn from each other, log( , ,i t kX − ) is expe
ffect on   and to have no significant effect otherwise.  
s social effects such as the effect specified in (8) is 
not straightforward. There has been much debate on exactly how society affects an 
ind
                                                
cted to have a positive 
e  , 1log( )i tY +
 
3.3. Identification of social effects 
 
The identification of endogenou
ividual and whether “real” social effects in economic decision-making actually 
exist. 13 The seminal work by Manski (1993, 2000) tackles the identification problem 
theoretically. He describes and formalizes three hypotheses to explain the observation 
that individuals in the same social group tend to behave similarly, only one of which 
is endogenous and produces the so-called social multiplier effects. First, endogenous 
social effects cause individual behaviour to vary with group behaviour. There is an 
endogenous effect if, ceteris paribus, individual outcome tends to vary with group 
achievement. Second, there can be exogenous social effects, where individual 
behaviour varies with the exogenous group characteristics. Third, correlated effects 
exist where individuals in the same group behave similarly because they have similar 
individual characteristics or face the same environment. The last effect is not a social 
effect. The three effects have different policy implications. Manski gives the example 
of high school students. If a tutoring programme is implemented for some of the 
students, then there can be important social multipliers if there are endogenous 
effects. In this case the programme does not only affect the achievement of the tutored 
 
13 Social effects are not only analysed in adoption behaviour or in output performance, where the 
channel of social interactions is mainly information, but also in other types of behaviour where the 
social interaction may rather be exhibited via norms. For example, Borjas (1992) tested the effect of 
average earnings within the same ethnic group as the parents on current earnings of the children, which 
was assumed to work via peer group pressure on the parents. Bertrand, e.a. (2000) used a similar basic 
test to analyse welfare benefit use and how being part of a social group may inhibit mobility. Krishnan 
(2001) analysed the fertility behaviour of Indian women. Yamauchi (2007) shows that learning about 
returns to schooling is faster when the variation in observed characteristics is larger. 
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students, but indirectly also affects the achievement of other students in the group. 
The other two effects do not generate this social multiplier. In the case of technique 
promotion, only the existence of endogenous social effects will augment the effort of 
teaching techniques to a limited number of interested farmers by increasing not only 
the output of the contacted farmers but also the output of other farmers in the contact 
farmers reference groups. 
In Manski (1993, 2000) there are three important econometric issues to take into 
account when trying to identify endogenous social effects: (1) the simultaneity or 
ref
oup, but the 
beh
                                                
lection problem, (2) the problem of identifying the exact reference group and (3) 
the omitted variables problem. A problem is how to model social effects empirically 
taking these issues into account as discussed by Brock and Durlauf (2001). In what 
follows we discuss the three issues in turn and we will highlight how the specific 
features of the Nyakatoke dataset can be used to approach the problems.  
First, the reflection problem arises because the behaviour of farmers in the 
reference group affects the behaviour of an individual farmer in that gr
aviour of that farmer in turn affects group behaviour, causing simultaneity. One of 
the possible solutions Manski offers is to make the model dynamic and assume a lag 
in the transmission of social effects.14 Including lagged group behaviour instead of 
contemporaneous group behaviour is necessary but not sufficient for identification. 
Using lagged group behaviour only offers a solution to the identification problem 
when the process of social effects is observed out of equilibrium. Moreover, the 
timing of the lag has to be established. Fortunately, both these conditions are satisfied 
in the Nyakatoke data set. Only few farmers apply the techniques, and farmers 
generally feel they are not necessary yet or too difficult to apply. This suggests an out-
of-equilibrium situation of banana cultivation methods. Furthermore, data were 
collected on current banana harvests but also retroactively for the previous year. This 
one year time lag is appropriate since the banana plants take approximately one year 
to become fully grown and flowering and before the results of technique use may be 
visible in the harvested banana bunches.  
 
14 Another alternative Manski and others propose is to use a non-linear model, which presumes 
knowing the correct non-linear function. Or one could use another feature of group behaviour, such as 
the median instead of the mean, but again one has to know a priori the relevant feature. And the last 
alternative they offer is to use instrumental variables that directly affect outcome of some but not all 
group members. 
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Second, identifying social effects strongly depends on the identification of the 
reference group. In most of the existing empirical literature farmers living in the same 
nei
he coefficient on 
ghbourhood, the same village, district or ethnic group are assumed to be group 
members. However, these are all expected interaction groups. If the true information 
networks do not match these expectations, the village averages used in empirical 
analysis are only estimates of individual specific variables. Moreover, they may not 
show much variation for observations within the same geographical boundaries. 
Mostly these expected information groups are exclusive: an individual belongs to only 
one interaction group. Recently, attempts have been made to collect information on 
the exact interaction groups which farmers belong to. Udry and Conley (2000) 
collected data on pineapple growing farmers in Ghana. They asked whether and how 
many times the interviewed farmers had talked to a list of persons. Their data show 
that information networks do not necessarily cover a whole village or are mutually 
exclusive, but may show complicated patterns. The Nyakatoke data contain individual 
level information on actual social groups farmers are part of (kinship networks, 
geographical networks and self-reported informal insurance networks) and these 
characteristics were shown in Section 2 to be reasonable proxies for farmer 
information networks. Therefore they are used as individual level reference groups in 
the empirical analysis in Section 5.  
Third, the estimation of social effects often suffers from an omitted variables bias, 
which leads to biased estimates of t , ,i t kX − . Equation (8) represents 
the
 is typ
 pure endogenous effects model where it is assumed that exogenous effects are 
non-existent. This assumption is a very strong one, and ically made because data 
on exogenous characteristics of group members are not readily available. Where 
social groups are endogenously formed, the problem is even more serious. So far we 
have assumed that the rules of group formation do not have any effect on the 
identification of social effects, but when possible, individuals will endogenously sort 
themselves into groups. For example, farmers will try to link up with farmers, who 
have certain characteristics or abilities, and De Weerdt (2004) finds for Nyakatoke 
that characteristics such as kinship, clan, distance, education and wealth correlate with 
informal insurance group formation. When endogenous matching takes place, there is 
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strong potential for self-selection bias,15 and the endogenous social effects may be 
misinterpreted. The variables that drive group formation may also drive farmers’ 
outcomes, but there are no endogenous social effects present. Since we have 
information on exogenous characteristics of all intra-village group members, we can 
explicitly include the exogenous group characteristics as controls ( ) together 
with average group behaviour (
, ,i t kZ−
, ,i t kX − ) and the individual controls ( ,i tZ ), so the social 
learning test becomes: 
 , ,, 1 0 1 , 2, 3, , , ,log( ) log( ) log( ) log( )i t ki t i t k k i t k i tY Z X Zα α α α−+ −= + + + + u    (9) 
Identification of the different social effects is then ensured if there is no 
multicollinearity present. It holds that: (1) If 1 0α ≠  correlated effects exist; (2) if 
2, 0kα ≠  there are endogenous social effects in group k; and (3) if 3, 0kα ≠ , 
exogenous social effects exist in group k. Only in case (2) will farmer behaviour vary 
with behaviour in the reference group. Only this effect produces social multiplying 
effects in banana cultivation.  
The advantage of working with data on exact group composition and lagged 
average group behaviour is rare in the empirical social interactions literature, and to 
our knowledge it is unique to have information on different types of individual 
specific reference groups and the exogenous characteristics of each of the members.16  
 
 
4. Empirical model  
 
The existence and type of social interactions will be tested for two specifications: 
technique adoption behaviour and banana output. First, we test whether the technique 
adoption behaviour of a farmer ( ) is influenced by the technique adoption 
behaviour in the reference group (
iA
iA− ): 
 0 1 2, 3,i i k i k i iA Z A Z uα α α α− −= + + + +  (10) 
                                                 
15 Brock and Durlauf (2001) show that self-selection may actually facilitate identification. Self-
selection may induce the sort of non-linearities that generate identification of the endogenous effects. 
16 Although the data have many advantages for analysing social effects, they also have shortcomings 
such as being a small and geographically very concentrated sample. 
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The dependent variable is one if the household uses the technique and zero otherwise. 
The reference group behaviour iA−  is captured by the number of group members 
using technique. Unfortunately, no information was collected on the year of adoption, 
so we are forced to study group and individual behaviour contemporaneously. iZ  is a 
vector of individual characteristics, iZ−  is a vector of exogenous characteristics of 
farmer i’s reference group (farmer i is always excluded from variables that capture 
group behaviour or group characteristics) and  is  iu
2(0, )uN σ . The endogeneity and 
reflection problem is in this case potentially serious, as controlling for all possible 
exogenous variables that may determine both group and individual adoption may not 
be sufficiently credible, not least if individuals self-select into groups, so that 
individuals with a shared interest in innovation may be part of the same group. 
However, the nature of the groups used makes this less likely to be a problem, 
definitely for two of the groupings chosen as membership is exogenously determined: 
kinship, and given traditional communal land allocation, neighbourhood. The problem 
may be more important for the informal insurance network, even though its purpose 
of existence appears very different from adoption of technologies. Overall, however, 
we cannot claim too much from the regressions based on (10).  
Vector iZ  contains household level information on (1) land suited for banana 
cultivation17 (kibanja), (2) the quality of the land, measured by two dummy variables 
capturing whether land quality is higher than the average in the village (high quality) 
or average (average quality) as reported by the household (3) the number of adults 
present to capture labour availability, and (4) a dummy for radio ownership (radio) 
representing the household’s access to information. Individual characteristics are (1) 
gender (sex) to correct for possible gender biases in banana cultivation, and (2) age, to 
capture experience in banana growing.18 Furthermore, two dummies are included to 
                                                 
17 This type of plots is called the kibanja in Swahili. See ARI Maruku (1999, p.45), Mitti and 
Rweyemamu (2001, p.15), and Maruo (2002, p.151), for characteristics of the kibanja and other plot 
types and the type of crops grown on different plot types. The number of hectares that can be cultivated 
with banana trees is usually restricted to kibanja, which is the plot around the house. We take the area 
of the kibanja as exogenous. There is a very strong case to do so because the area where the survey was 
done is characterised by high population density, and there is not much opportunity to expand the 
kibanja. The kibanja is also cultivated with coffee, maize and beans, all intercropped. There is no 
information on the cultivated area separately for each household member, so total household kibanja 
land is used. Individual information would be nearly impossible to collect since husband and wife often 
care for all the banana trees and other crops in the kibanja together. 
18 In (10) individual level characteristics are the characteristics of the household head but in (11) they 
are the characteristics of the banana grower. 
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capture whether the farmer completed (1) lower primary schooling (first four years) 
and (2) higher primary schooling (years five to seven).  
Vector iZ−  (exogenous characteristics of the reference group) includes (1) the 
number of household heads in the reference group, who completed lower primary 
schooling (number of heads lower primary), (2) the number of heads in the reference 
group, who have completed higher primary schooling (number of heads higher 
primary), (3) the average age of the household heads in the reference group (average 
age heads), (4) the number of male headed households in the reference group, (5)  
group members average size of land suitable for growing bananas (average kibanja 
size), and to correct for group size, (6) the number of members in the whole group 
(group size) and (7) its squared term (group size2) are also included. 
Finding social effects in (10) may well be the result of mimicking or social 
pressure. To test whether social learning exists in a credible way, we test whether 
individual actual outcomes in period t ( ) are affected by the average benefits of 
technique use in the reference group in the previous period by using a modification of 
the log-linearised Cobb-Douglas production function in (9): 
,i tY
 , 1, 0 1 2, 3,log( ) log( ) log( ) log( )i ti t i k k i i tY Z P Zα α α α− − −= + + + + ,u   (11) 
where iZ  and iZ−  are as previously described. , 1i tP− −  is the average banana yield 
(banana output per hectare) at time t-1 of the households that form part of farmer i’s 
reference group. It serves as a proxy for the actual average group benefit of technique 
adoption. More correctly, it captures the output per hectare effect of the total of 
agricultural methods applied by group members. We use the average yield of the 
households that are linked to the household farmer i is part of, so intra-household 
information pooling is assumed (and suggested by the results in Table 2). If any 
household member receives information on banana cultivation, this information will 
be shared with fellow banana growing household members.19 We use average yields, 
and not other moments of the distribution of yields as the main impact of the 
improved techniques is to stem the decline in yields, and not so much the variance, as 
                                                 
19 Prices are not included. The price of a bunch of bananas does not vary between neighbourhoods in 
the village and is roughly equal throughout the year. There is no specific time for harvesting bananas, 
which are grown continuously during the year. Although the banana output is captured in monetary 
values, differences truly reflect quantitative differences. 
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was discussed in section 2. Using lagged values allows us to more convincingly 
capture social effects going from the reference group onto the farmer.  
Table 4 contains selected descriptive statistics of individual characteristics of 
banana growers and the number of group members for reference group k. The 
reference groups are as defined previously: kinship related farmers, neighbours and 
informal insurance members. Although bananas are grown by all households, only 95 
persons (81% of all banana growers) mentioned selling bananas as an income earning 
activity. For banana selling respondents we have information on total output values, 
including both the amount sold and the amount consumed by the household but for 
banana growers who do not sell any surplus we have neither so these observations 
will drop from the analysis.20 Table 4 also shows that some banana growers do not 
have members of the same kin in the village which will further reduce the number of 
observations due to missing variables for group characteristics.  
 
Table 4 
Characteristics of banana growers 
Variables Average Observations 
Individual characteristics of 117 banana growers:   
Male growers (%) 50 117 
Age (years) 43 117 
Lower primary education (% completed standard 1 to 4) 77 117 
Higher primary education (% completed standard 5 to 7) 56 117 
Banana sellers (as % of banana growers) 81 117 
Total banana output value of sellers (in Tsha) 6,841 95 
   
Of all households with at least one banana grower:   
Kibanja (hectare) 0.5 101 
Total land holdings (hectare) 1.2 101 
Adults present in the household (> 15 years) 2 101 
Radio ownership (%) 36 101 
   
Social groups of banana sellers ( nr of persons in group):   
Number of kinship members 8 88b
Banana selling kinship members 1999 5 88 
Number of neighbours (living within less than 300 metres) 32 95 
Banana selling neighbours 1999 21 95 
Number of informal insurance network members 10 95 
Banana selling informal insurance network members 1999 7 95 
a Tanzanian Shilling (1 US$=+/-800Tsh; in 2000); b There are some banana sellers who do not have any 
kin related households in the village, hence the lower number of observations. 
 
                                                 
20 Due to the design of the survey we do not have information on output values for those households 
who did not mention banana cultivation as a source of cash income, as the survey aimed to capture only 
the income earning activities in which individuals were engaged in, in a context of a high diversity of 
income earning activities. This observation suggests a possible sample selection problem (missing 
output data for non-selling banana growers), although no obvious candidates for identifying 
instruments exist in the data so investigating this further proved not feasible. 
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5. Estimation results 
 
The results of the specifications introduced above will be discussed in turn. Tables 
5 and 6 show the effects of group variables on individual behaviour and output while 
the effects of individual farmer and land characteristics are shown in the Annex 
(Tables A2 and A3). To explore technique adoption behaviour we run a probit 
estimation on pooled techniques correcting for household clustering.21 With respect to 
individual level effects on household adoption of techniques (see Annex Table A2) 
we find that completing higher primary education and ownership of a radio are 
consistently positive determinants of technique adoption. Additional to individual 
characteristics, group level effects also appear to play a role in individual adoption 
behaviour (shown in Table 5).  
Although the coefficients differ in magnitude, the number of reference group 
members using a technique has a positive and significant effect for all types of 
reference groups (after correction for group size). An additional adopting kin or 
informal insurance network member increases the probability of a farmer adopting a 
technique by 6 per cent. Distance based groups show a lower impact of only 2 per 
cent. A similar result was found by Isham (2002) analysing fertiliser adoption of 
Tanzanian farmers. It appeared that households with ethnically based affiliations were 
more likely to diffuse the technology successfully. Exogenous social effects are found 
only in informal insurance networks. An additional household in the group with a 
head, who completed lower primary school, positively affects the individual 
probability of adoption by 3 per cent. Although correlations consistent with social 
effects appear to exist in technique adoption, it needs to be established whether this 
translates into social effects in banana outcomes. 
 
 
                                                 
21 We chose to pool techniques rather than analysing the number of techniques adopted via ordered 
probit. The reason is that it is not clear whether more techniques are better than only a few. The 
techniques are suited to mitigate the effects of a range of different banana growing problems such as 
the black sigatoka disease or weevil attacks. Dependent on the type of problem a farmer faces, a certain 
technique will be beneficial. 
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Table 5 
Marginal group effects on technique adoption, pooled techniquesa  
Dependent variable: use of 
technique 0/1 
 
Kinship Neighbours 
<300m 
Informal insurance 
network 
Group characteristics    
Number of group members  0.064*** 0.022*** 0.059*** 
   using technique (-i) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) 
Average age heads -0.000 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) 
Number of male heads -0.014 -0.005 -0.027* 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) 
Heads with lower primary 0.007 -0.004 0.030* 
 (0.025) (0.011) (0.016) 
Heads with higher primary -0.010 0.004 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.008) (0.016) 
Average kibanja size in group -0.074 0.081 -0.038 
 (0.071) (0.207) (0.090) 
Group size -0.003 -0.005 -0.016 
 (0.021) (0.008) (0.018) 
(Group size)2 -0.000 0.000** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Observations 1003 1003 1003 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.22 0.22 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; adjusted for household clustering. Effects of household 
characteristics are shown in Annex Table A2.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
a Probit marginal effects. There are 10 observations per household since technique adoption was asked 
for a series of 10 techniques. Number of observations limited by banana growing households with 
banana growing kin members (101); further limited by 7 missing observations on technique use. 
 
To test social interactions in banana output using specification (11) all continuous 
variables are in logarithms, and dummies remain in levels. Variables with a lot of zero 
observations remain in the regression as discrete variables to prevent losing many 
observations while taking logarithms. 
In Table 6 we present the results of the social interactions test, which allows 
individual output to vary with average group yield and exogenous group and 
individual characteristics. Assuming that farmers prefer to learn from their high yield 
group members rather than from poorer performing farmers (as suggested by the data, 
see Table 3), as part of our test, the highest yield farmer in each reference group is 
excluded from the analysis all together. Including “teachers” may underestimate the 
social effects.22 This is tested by comparing the results when all farmers are included 
(columns 1 to 3) with the results when the highest productive farmer in a group is 
                                                 
22 Farmers with the highest agricultural productivity in a group are more likely to teach other group 
members than to learn from them. Including these observations disregards that a direction to learning 
may exist. 
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excluded (columns 4 to 6). Individual effects are presented in Table A3 and highlight 
the importance of land size, land quality and completing lower primary education.  
There is evidence of social effects but again it differs by group. The single 
reference group for which endogenous social effects clearly exist is based on kinship 
links. In informal insurance groups individual behaviour varies only with exogenous 
characteristics of the group, namely the number of members who completed lower 
primary education and the average kibanja size of the group members. In distance 
based groups no social learning effects seem to be present.23   
Table 6 lends support to the hypothesis that there is a direction to the social effects 
going from the better to the less performing group members. Both the magnitude and 
the significance of the endogenous social effect found in kinship groups increase 
when best performing farmers are excluded from the analysis. The exogenous social 
effects of lower primary education in informal insurance networks also increase in 
magnitude when high productive farmers are excluded. 
The endogenous social effect found in kinship based groups suggests there is 
potential for positive externalities of efforts to increase productivity of only a few 
well-targeted farmers. In informal insurance groups it is the stock of education in the 
group that positively influences individual member output. This effect is comparable 
to the positive intra-household externality of a literate household member described 
by Basu and Foster (1998). In the distance based group where no social effects are 
present, farmers appear to rely more on their own education (see Table A3). In both 
kinship related and informal insurance related groups, having larger farm holders as 
members positively affects individual outcome. This may also capture an information 
externality where farm size is associated with a higher level of innovation and 
technique adoption.  
 
                                                 
23 All group results hold, even when lagged own productivity is included, which is itself significant. 
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Table 6 
Effect of average group yield on individual banana outcomesa  
 All farmers in network included Highest productive farmer in network excluded
Dependent: 
Log(banana harvest 
value) 
Kinship 
 
 
(1) 
Neighbours 
<300m 
 
(2) 
Informal 
insurance 
network 
(3) 
Kinship 
 
 
(4) 
Neighbours 
<300m 
 
(5) 
Informal 
insurance 
network 
(6) 
Log(Average banana 
yield t-1) 0.265 -0.571 0.054 0.466** -0.33 0.108 
 (0.191) (0.431) (0.170) (0.225) (0.576) (0.195) 
Log(Average age) -1.294 -1.584 -0.071 -1.788 -2.335 -0.013 
 (1.318) (2.732) (0.994) (1.418) (2.963) (1.022) 
Number male heads  -0.432*** -0.128 -0.178 -0.476*** -0.118 -0.127 
 (0.164) (0.168) (0.132) (0.178) (0.173) (0.140) 
Heads lower primary 0.202 0.218 0.301** 0.195 0.209 0.326** 
 (0.262) (0.132) (0.146) (0.295) (0.137) (0.153) 
Heads higher primary -0.201 -0.063 -0.090 -0.203 -0.071 -0.180 
 (0.172) (0.074) (0.124) (0.196) (0.079) (0.133) 
Log(Avg kibanja ha) 0.844 0.983 1.199** 1.333** 1.183 1.201** 
 (0.560) (1.415) (0.472) (0.597) (1.479) (0.501) 
Group size 0.241 0.002 -0.134 0.270 0.016 -0.165 
 (0.173) (0.100) (0.152) (0.181) (0.105) (0.157) 
(Group size)2 0.002 -0.000 0.005** 0.002 -0.000 0.006** 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003) 
Constant 9.872 15.561 7.428* 10.980 16.714 8.168* 
 (6.234) (12.109) (4.323) (6.575) (14.092) (4.408) 
Observations 87 95 95 76 90 85 
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.32 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.36 
Standard errors in parentheses. Effects of individual characteristics can be found in Annex Table A3. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
The table supports the idea that social capital is truly capital in the sense that it 
contributes to production as suggested in Narayan and Pritchett (1999). The empirical 
literature on the productive effects of social capital is generally limited to 
entrepreneurial activity. Unlike the result found in Fafchamps and Minten (2002) 
where family based network relationships appear to reduce firm productivity amongst 
traders in Madagascar, in agricultural households in Nyakatoke family based 
relationships seem to have more beneficial effects. But even though the results 
obtained here are suggestive of the existence of social effects, it has to be borne in 
mind that they may look different or may even be non-existent when analysing other 
villages, other types of reference groups or other crops. For example Munshi (2004) 
showed that social learning effects are crop specific and are different for wheat and 
rice growers in India. 
A remaining question is why the endogenous social effect only exists in kinship 
related groups. The answer possibly lies in the fact that, in order to gain from the 
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knowledge of other farmers, knowledge has to be passed on very meticulously. 
Farmers need to know the exact way in which good results are obtained.24 Presumably 
kinship related farmers, such as parents and siblings put more effort into explaining 
the technology than would neighbours or informal insurance network members do.  
Moreover, among kin-related farmers there may be fewer unobserved characteristics 
which can reduce information flows.25
   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper departed from the observation of an apparently slow diffusion process 
of productivity enhancing techniques in banana cultivation in Nyakatoke, a village in 
north-western Tanzania. This may cast doubt on the effectiveness of extension 
activities. We have highlighted the possibility that there are positive externalities of 
the few farmers who visit extension centres and learn new banana cultivation 
methods. Moreover, we studied whether these externalities are dependent on the 
relationship between farmers. 
The analytical framework involved Bayesian updating of beliefs with regard to the 
benefit of technique adoption. The updating process is made dependent on the 
relationship between farmers. A social interaction test of the Manski type was derived 
where individual output varies with (1) average group achievement (endogenous 
social effects), (2) group characteristics (exogenous social effects), and (3) individual 
characteristics (correlated effects). Due to the nature of our dataset, solutions were 
found to tackle potential econometric problems which usually hamper the 
identification of different types of social effects. For example, lagged group 
achievement instead of contemporaneous achievement was used to address 
simultaneity. Moreover, since the data were collected with the specific aim of 
analysing social groups the exact composition of three different reference groups is 
known and data on the achievement and socio-economic characteristics of all 
                                                 
24 For example, a technique exists to prevent weevils from attacking the banana plant. The farmer has 
to put some freshly cut pieces of the banana stem around the plant. Those pieces will attract the weevils 
before they reach the plant. The farmer has to clean these cut pieces from weevils attached to the trap at 
regular times, e.g. at least once a day. But some periods of the day are known to be better suited to 
clean these weevil traps. 
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reference group members is available. This enabled us to use individual specific 
reference groups and include exogenous group controls to tackle standard difficulties 
related to identification and omitted variables bias respectively. 
Rather than studying one social group as is usually the case, three different 
reference groups were tested for the existence of social effects. In order of exogeneity 
these are (1) kinship related groups, (2) neighbourhoods and (3) self-reported informal 
insurance groups. Social effects appeared to exist in some, but not all groups, and the 
nature of the effects was quite different according to the group under analysis. 
Household technique adoption behaviour was strongly affected by the number of 
adopting group members in all groups, but the group effect was smaller in 
neighbourhoods. Finding social effects in technique adoption behaviour did not 
appear to automatically give rise to social effects in banana output. Endogenous social 
effects only existed within kinship related reference groups. Although no endogenous 
social effects were found within informal insurance networks, there are exogenous 
social effects of education and group members average banana land size. All social 
effects appear to work from the better to the less performing group members.  
In sum, the results highlight especially that the definition of the reference group 
plays an important role in the identification of social effects. For the survey village of 
Nyakatoke in north-western Tanzania the results suggest that social effects in 
technique adoption exist in all reference groups tested but information transmission 
only has social multiplier effects on farmer’s output in one of the reference groups. To 
obtain the widest output externalities of teaching techniques to a limited group of 
farmers, it might be necessary to choose as contact farmers those belonging to 
different kinship groups within which information diffusion has better output results.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
25 Munshi (2004) shows that information flows are weaker in a heterogeneous population when 
performance of a new technology is sensitive to unobserved individual characteristics.  
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Annexes 
Table A1 
Explanation of techniques to maintain banana plants 
Technique Explanation 
1.  Special way of digging 
the hole 
Hole preparation: when digging the 60 cm deep hole, soil from the top 
30 cm should be heaped on one side of the hole and soil from the other 
30 cm on the other side.  The top soil should be mixed with organic 
manure (see next technique) and returned to the hole first, in preparation 
for planting.  If this is not enough to fill the hole, top soil from the 
surrounding areas should be added instead of using the bottom soil. 
2.  Applying 
fertiliser/manure  
Soil preparation: the best manure to use is farmyard manure from cattle, 
pigs, goats and chicken, also compost or coffee husk humus can be 
used.  The manure (5 debe or 70 kg) should be thoroughly mixed with 
the top soil and the hole filled with this mixture should be left 
undisturbed for minimum 2 weeks. 
3.  Hot water treatment of 
the stem before planting 
Cleaning of planting material: weevils are mainly located in the roots 
and corms of the banana plants.  Therefore paring is needed (see 
“paring”) and in addition pared suckers and corms can be immersed in 
hot water, then sterilised and dipped in an appropriate insecticide 
solution. 
4.  Dipping stem in 
insecticide solution 
Cleaning of planting material: before planting, dipping the stem in an 
insecticide solution, used in combination with or without hot water 
treatment. 
5.  Mulching 1 meter from 
stem 
Mulching conserves moisture, controls weeds, contributes to soil 
fertility and reduces soil erosion.  But the mulch should be kept away 
from the base of the plants to prevent superficial root growth. 
6.  Trench-manuring Water conservation: the banana plant requires a lot of water and is 
susceptible to drought.  In areas with less then 1000mm of rainfall 
annually, water conservation methods should be applied.  One of the 
recommended methods of rainwater conservation is trench-manuring.  
Trenches are dug midway between the banana stools.  The bottom of the 
holes are filled with farm manure and topped up with top soil.  Manure 
absorbs and stores water which the plants can use during the dry season.  
An alternative to manure is freshly cut banana pseudostem. 
7.  Paring Cleaning of planting material: weevils are mainly located in the roots 
and corms of the banana plants.  To reduce the incidence of transferring 
pests from one infected site to a non-infected one when transplanting 
suckers one can do the following: remove the roots and pare the corm 
and then cut off all weevil tunnels. 
8.  Desuckering (3 plants 
per stool) 
Ideally there should be 3 plants growing on one stool at varying stages 
of development.  Any more suckers deplete the mat of its vital nutrients 
and provide unnecessary shade. 
9.  Harvest hygiene The pseudostem of a harvested banana plant should be cut down at the 
corm level and soil should be put on the surface to reduce weevil 
attraction. 
10.  Weevil trapping It is not the adult weevils that damage the banana plant but their larvae.  
Adult weevils are strongly attracted to freshly cut pseudostems and 
corms so they are ideal for weevil trapping.  Split pseudostems are 
placed facing downwards on the ground on opposite sides of the stem.  
Continuous cleaning of the trap is necessary.   
 Source: Mbwana, A.S.S e.a. (1998), “A Guide to Growing Bananas in the Eastern African Highlands”, 
ICIPE 
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Figure A1 
Technique diffusion 
Note: Data on 397 techniques known and the source of information. Farmers (small black dots) are 
connected to their technique learning source, i.e. other farmers in the village (known by name), farmer 
extension workers, relatives not living in the village, other farmers not living in the village but known 
by name and other persons not living in the village and not known by name. The bottom layer includes 
out-of-village sources while upper layer black dots are all farmers interviewed who know at least one 
technique. 
 
Figure A2 
Hypothetical advice links 
Note: Farmers are connected to their advice source. Outside advice sources are extension workers or 
other farmers. Other dots are farmers interviewed as organised by software programme “dotty”. 
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Table A2 
Household technique adoption: farmer effectsa – to Table 5. 
Dependent variable: use of 
technique (0/1) 
Kinship Neighbours 
<300m 
Informal insurance 
network 
Household characteristics    
Kibanja area (hectare) 0.093** 0.072 0.039 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.042) 
Land perceived of high quality -0.009 0.085 0.010 
 (0.041) (0.077) (0.047) 
Land perceived of average quality 0.012 0.035 -0.017 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.033) 
Adults present 0.010 0.017 0.036** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Age of household head 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sex of household head (1=male) 0.032 -0.013 0.017 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.041) 
Head lower primary (year 1 to 4) 0.015 -0.000 -0.043 
 (0.057) (0.051) (0.057) 
Head higher primary (year 5 to 7) 0.069* 0.066* 0.078** 
 (0.039) (0.034) (0.033) 
Household owns radio 0.067* 0.089** 0.069* 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.037) 
a Pooled techniques. Technique adoption was asked for a series of 10 techniques; standard errors are 
adjusted for household clustering, probit marginal effects.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table A3 
Effect of individual characteristics on banana output – to Table 6. 
All farmers in network included Highest productive farmer in network 
excluded 
Dependent: Log(banana harvest 
value) 
Kinship 
 
 
(1) 
Neighbours
<300m 
 
(2) 
Informal 
insurance 
network 
(3) 
Kinship 
 
 
(4) 
Neighbours
<300m 
 
(5) 
Informal 
insurance 
network 
(6) 
Kibanja area (hectare) 0.671*** 0.614*** 0.368* 0.697*** 0.604** 0.501** 
 (0.213) (0.224) (0.208) (0.236) (0.243) (0.246) 
Land perceived of high quality 1.198*** 0.895* 1.502*** 1.278** 0.934* 1.517*** 
 (0.439) (0.507) (0.403) (0.484) (0.533) (0.437) 
Land perceived of avg quality 0.636* 0.720** 1.236*** 0.483 0.659* 1.194*** 
 (0.340) (0.332) (0.304) (0.371) (0.348) (0.334) 
Adults present 0.327 0.516 0.412 0.190 0.370 0.228 
 (0.356) (0.344) (0.346) (0.377) (0.372) (0.376) 
Age of household head 0.149 0.461 0.002 -0.004 0.358 -0.266 
 (0.469) (0.497) (0.444) (0.493) (0.512) (0.467) 
Sex of household head (1=male) -0.241 -0.416 -0.336 -0.151 -0.343 -0.298 
 (0.282) (0.284) (0.257) (0.307) (0.302) (0.281) 
Head lower primary (year 1 to 4) 1.026** 1.254*** 0.546 1.017** 1.157** 0.532 
 (0.447) (0.423) (0.432) (0.475) (0.438) (0.447) 
Head higher primary (5 to 7) -0.499 -0.341 -0.432 -0.586 -0.350 -0.561 
 (0.385) (0.382) (0.344) (0.413) (0.394) (0.363) 
Household owns radio 0.537 0.349 0.116 0.504 0.304 -0.089 
 (0.347) (0.320) (0.284) (0.380) (0.331) (0.311) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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